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Sex is always well worth its two-fold cost.
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Sex is considered as an evolutionary paradox, since its evolutionary advantage does not necessarily
overcome the two fold cost of sharing half of one’s offspring’s genome with another member of the
population. Here we demonstrate that sexual reproduction can be evolutionary stable even when
its Darwinian fitness is twice as low when compared to the fitness of asexual mutants. We also
show that more than two sexes are always evolutionary unstable. Our approach generalizes the
evolutionary game theory to analyze species whose members are able to sense the sexual state of
their conspecifics and to switch sexes consequently. The widespread emergence and maintenance
of sex follows therefore from its co-evolution with even more widespread environmental sensing
abilities.
PACS numbers:
Emergence of sexual reproduction implies universally
a two-fold cost to Darwinian fitness[1, 2]. A sexual indi-
vidual shares half of the offspring’s genome with another
member of the population, while an asexual one generates
almost exact replicas of itself. As a consequence, sexual
reproduction transfers only half of the amount of the in-
dividual’s genes to the next generation, when compared
to parthenogenesis.
The evolutionary driving forces of sexual reproduction
discussed so far, lack either the generality or the strength
to overcome the two-fold cost of sex, causing therefore a
difficulty to explain evolution and maintenance of sex
in some species. Sex increases genetic variability by re-
combination of the parental chromosomes[3, 4], making
a population to be more stable against unpredictable
threats, either of internal (deleterious mutations[5, 6]) or
external (parasites[7, 8], fluctuating environment[9, 10])
origins. It also optimizes the evolutionary search for
the optimal gene combinations in a single individual
(epistasis[11]). There are organisms, however, that re-
produce sexually, do not have high rate of deleterious
mutation, lack parasites and live for a long time in per-
manent environments.
The paradox is not solved by assuming variability as
the most important drive for sexual reproduction. In
this case, why are species with more than two sexes
not found, and why is asexual reproduction still so
widespread[12, 13]? The absence of populations with
three or more sexes in nature raises also some doubt con-
cerning genetic variability as the main driving force for
evolution of sex. For instance, combination of genetic
material from more than two parents may be beneficial
under evolutionary conditions that strongly promote a
genetically diverse population. There is no known case
of more than two sexes, even in case of species that per-
ished due to lack of their ability to resist a significant
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environmental threat.
The paradox of sex can be solved either by presenting
a ubiquitous and strong advantage for sex applicable to
all sexual species or by demonstrating how it can evolve
despite reduction of Darwinian fitness. In general, the
high two fold cost of sex significantly complicates efforts
to confirm that sexual reproduction increases Darwinian
fitness compared to asexual one. We provide an alterna-
tive that successfully solves this paradox, demonstrating
that sex can be stable even at twice the cost of partheno-
genesis.
To discuss the emergence and maintenance of sex, we
assume its onset as evolution of abilities to switch be-
tween different sexual states and to sense the sexual dis-
tribution of the near environment. These skills remain
in modern species: attraction between different sexes is
ubiquitous for all animals and some species, even ver-
tebrates, are able to change sex as a function of their
environment[14]. We assume that ultimately the devel-
opment of the switch/sensor complex led to assortative
interactions of complementary sexes, with subsequent
degradation of the switching ability.
Consider such organism, able to switch between two
sexes F and M . Initially, the switch/sensor complex is
assumed to choose sex F in any situation, leading to a
homogeneous asexual population. A sexual population
corresponds to individuals who always choose the sexual
state that is opposite to the average sex of the environ-
ment: F in a M environment or M in a F environment.
The development of sexual reproduction is governed by
its evolutionary payoffs, in our case the growth ratesWpq
of sex p in environment of sex q (p, q ∈ {F,M}). The
Darwinian fitness G of an individual can be associated
with its mean payoff from all possible situations (F in F ,
F in M , M in F and M in M). It is determined, there-
fore, by the individual sensor and switch characteristics,
since they affect the probabilities to possess a specific sex
under particular circumstances. Evolution proceeds by
steps; the existing phenotypes (specific sensor and switch
characteristics) in a population are replaced by favorable
2mutants possessing greater fitness due to their optimal
sensor and switch abilities. This process culminates in
an evolutionary stable population where no mutants can
outperform the host phenotype.
The possibility of existence of a stable, sexually re-
producing population with a reduced Darwinian fitness
(see Box 1) can be explained briefly as follows. The
average fitness in a sexual population Gs is given by
(WFM +WMF )/2, since an individual is either F in en-
vironment of M or M in environment of F . The fitness
in an asexual population (F only) is Ga = WFF . The
sexual population is evolutionary stable when the fitness
of a parthenogenetic mutant Gm =WFM is smaller than
Gs. This occurs when WMF > WFM , that may occur
even if Ga > Gs. Rigorous mathematical analysis pre-
dicts evolutionary stability of sexual populations even in
case of two-fold cost for sex, Ga ≈ 2Gs.
In this model a phenotype of an individual h is de-
scribed by its conditional probabilities αij to choose sex
i in environment of sex j. For two sexes F andM , it com-
prises two independent evolvable parameters (αFM , αFF )
corresponding to the conditional probabilities to possess
sex F in a M and a F environment respectively. They
define the entire set of the conditional probabilities αpq:
αFM , αMM = 1−αFM , αFF and αMF = 1−αFF . This
formalism follows previous works describing behavior by
conditional probabilities[15, 16, 17, 18, 19] and allows to
account for any sex determining mechanisms[20].
To determine whether a homogeneous population
(αFM , αFF ) is sexual or asexual, as well as to evaluate
its Darwinian fitness, one should determine the corre-
sponding unconditional probabilities Ωpq to possess sex
p in environment q. According to the definition of αpq
as a conditional probability to possess sex p in environ-
ment q, Ωpq equals αpq multiplied by the unconditional
probability Eq to be in environment q:
ΩMM = (1− αFM )EM ,
ΩMF = (1− αFF )(1 − EM ),
ΩFM = αFMEM ,
ΩFF = αFF (1− EM ). (1)
Assuming mean-field conditions in a population (proper-
ties of the environment are defined by the average value
of individual properties), the probability to be in a spe-
cific environment matches the individual unconditional
probability to possess the corresponding sex:
EM = ΩMM +ΩMF . (2)
Eqs. (1) and (2) result in:
EM =
1− αFF
1− αFF + αFM
. (3)
The statistics Ωpq can be expressed, therefore, through
(αFM , αFF ) only.
A population is sexual when it is composed of individ-
uals with (αFM = 1, αFF = 0) phenotype. This leads to
(ΩMF = ΩFM = 1/2,ΩMM = ΩFF = 0) meaning that
these individuals switch always to the sex that is com-
plementary to the environment. A population will be
asexual when it is composed of individuals with (αFM =
0, 0 ≤ αFF ≤ 1) or with (0 ≤ αFM ≤ 1, αFF = 1),
leading to ΩMF = ΩFM = 0,ΩMM = 1 or ΩFF =
1 or ΩMM = ΩFF = 1/2 respectively. The sexual state
of a population will be characterized by R, the prob-
ability to be in the sex opposite to the environment:
R = ΩFM + ΩMF . A population is sexual when R = 1,
and asexual for R = 0 (see Fig 1).
The evolutionary stable state of a population is deter-
mined by the values of the payoffs Wpq to possess sex p
in environment of sex q (see Methods):
Wpq =
F M
F 1 c
M b 0
. (4)
These payoffs also define the cost of sex, corresponding
to the ratio of fitness in asexual and sexual population
Cs = Ga/Gs =WFF /((WFM +WMF )/2):
Cs =
2
b+ c
. (5)
This expression links evolutionary stability to the cost of
sex.
Sexual populations (αFM = 1, αFF = 0) can be evo-
lutionary stable at a up to two-fold cost for sex Cs = 2
(see Fig. 2). In the case of a greater cost, evolution-
ary stability exists only for asexual populations. Tran-
sition from asexual to sexual population, therefore, may
occur with two-fold reduction of individual Darwinian
fitness. It should be stressed that (5) is valid only for
WMM ≪ WFF (see SM), which applies probably to all
sexual species. Greater values of WMM increase the ef-
fective cost of sex and, therefore, require stronger advan-
tages for sexual reproduction.
To compare our results with previous studies, one
should analyze the factors contributing to payoffs b and
c. By taking the individual fitness as the amount of genes
in progeny only, one obtains that b = c = 0.5 with the
accompanying two fold cost of sex paradox (Cs = 2, see
eq. (5)). In this case asexual mutants are twice more pro-
ductive, leading to the seeming evolutionary instability of
sexual populations. To solve the paradox, various studies
have tried to explain why the fitness of sexual reproduc-
tion would be higher than parthenogenesis (reducing Cs
to < 1), by considering additional phenomena such as
parasites[7, 8], fluctuating environment[9, 10] and dele-
terious mutations[5, 6] that affect payoffs and reduce so
the cost of sex. We demonstrate that the sensor/switch
abilities make sex evolutionary stable under conditions
of b = 1, c = 0, keeping Cs = 2 (see Fig. 2). This
introduces an asymmetry between female and male pay-
offs but does not require the reduction of the cost of sex,
providing so a general and self-consistent solution for the
sex paradox.
3Three and more sexes can not be evolutionary stable.
To show this, we assume a population to be sexual if
its members, when placed in a sexually pure environ-
ment, choose with equal probability a sex that is differ-
ent from the environment (This definition is an extrap-
olation of the predisposition to be a male in a female
environment and vice versa to the case of hypothetical
multi-parental reproduction. Other mechanisms that are
considered as multi-sexual include explicit requirements
for two parents[21, 22]). Our approach leads to frac-
tional values of the parameters αpq for more than two
sexes, causing the corresponding populations to be evo-
lutionary unstable (for instance in the case of three sexes:
α11 = 0, α21 = α31 = 1/2) (see Methods).
This work presents a rationale for maintenance of sex,
providing a universally applicable reason for overcom-
ing the two-fold cost of sex barrier. It explains the
widespread phenomenon of sexual reproduction by its
link to even more frequently occurring sensing abilities.
It allows subsuming existing and future explanations in a
framework that decouples the specific mechanisms deal-
ing with emergence and maintenance of sex from the two-
fold cost issue. The results are based on a novel approach
to incorporate communication in evolutionary game the-
ory, which can be extended to a general analysis of evo-
lution of information exchange and intelligence[23].
I. METHODS
Consider a population composed of a host h, charac-
terized by (αhFM , α
h
FF ) that is challenged by a mutantm,
characterized by (αmFM , α
m
FF ) = (α
h
FM + ∆α
m
FM , α
h
FF +
∆αmFF ). The evolutionary stability of such a population
requires that no mutant is fitter than the host:
G(m)−G(h) ≤ 0, (6)
where G(k) is the fitness of individual k.
The fitness is determined by the individual probabil-
ities Ωkpq to possess sex p in environment q, and by the
corresponding payoffs Wpq:
G(k) =
∑
pq
ΩkpqWpq . (7)
Following eqs. (1) and (3):
G(h) =
∑
pq
αhpqEqWpq, (8)
and
G(m) =
∑
pq
αmpqEqWpq, (9)
where Eq (3) is defined solely by the host’s values of
(αhFM , α
h
FF ) since we assume that the amount of mutants
is small.
Following eqs. (8), (9) and (4), the condition for evo-
lutionary stability (6) becomes:
∆αmFMEMc−∆α
m
FF (1− EM )(b − 1) ≤ 0. (10)
This expression divides, for each specific population (a
point in phenotype space (αhFM , α
h
FF )), the phenotype
space into two semi-planes corresponding to favorable
and non-favorable mutations (see Fig. 3).
According to (10), a sexual population (αhFM =
1, αhFF = 0) is evolutionary stable for b > 1 and c > 0.
For other payoff values, a population converges to asex-
ual states with (αhFM = 0) or (α
h
FF = 1). As shown in
Fig. 3, the linear properties of (10) prevent formation of
stable points with fractional values of αpq for sexual pop-
ulations (unless sex q is not present, Eq = 0 and the cor-
responding values αpq are irrelevant). This remains valid
for more than two sexes (see SM for a rigorous proof).
APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
1. Derivation of normalization
Reduction of the payoff table:
Wpq =
F M
F WFF WFM
M WMF WMM
, (A1)
to its two parameters form (4) requires two transforma-
tions:
W ′pq =Wpq −WMM , (A2)
and
W ′′pq =W
′
pq/(W
′
FF −W
′
MM ). (A3)
Consequently, the parameters b and c in (4) are:
b =
WMF −WMM
WFF −WMM
,
c =
WFM −WMM
WFF −WMM
. (A4)
The transformations (A2) and (A2) do not affect the
stability condition (6). Taking into account (8), (6) be-
comes
∑
pq ∆ΩpqWpq ≤ 0:
∆ΩFFWFF +∆ΩFMWFM + . . .
+ ∆ΩMFWMF +∆ΩMMWMM ≤ 0. (A5)
where ∆Ωpq =
(
Ωmpq − Ω
h
pq
)
.
Applying the first transformation (A2) to (A5) results
in:
∆ΩFFW
′
FF +∆ΩFMW
′
FM + . . .
+ ∆ΩMFW
′
MF +∆ΩMMW
′
MM + . . .
+ WMM
∑
pq
∆Ωpq ≤ 0. (A6)
4The last term in the left part vanishes (
∑
pq ∆Ωpq = 0)
preserving the form of condition (7). The second trans-
formation (A3) converts (A6) into
∑
pq ∆ΩpqW
′′
pq ≤ 0.
Expressions for cost of sex (5) and the ratio of fitness
in asexual and sexual population Cs = WFF /((WFM +
WMF )/2) are identical only in case WMM = 0. Other-
wise, using (A4):
2
b+ c
=
2WFF − 2WMM
WMF +WFM − 2WMM
. (A7)
Finite positive values of WMM , therefore, increase effec-
tive cost of sex:
2
b+ c
>
2WFF
WMF +WFM
. (A8)
2. Evolutionary stability for more than two sexes
In case of more than two sexes, fractional values of αpq
can not be evolutionary stable, since the only possibility
to confine a point with a line on the edge of a square is
when the line is parallel to the edge (see Fig 3, point iv).
This occurs only if the corresponding sex q is not present
in the population (Eq = 0). The same applies to multiple
sexes, with K dimensional cube and K − 1 dimensional
constraint for evolutionary stability.
A rigorous proof is as follows. The evolutionary sta-
bility of specific value of αij = αst requires ∂G/∂αij = 0
at αst in case αst 6= 0 and αst 6= 1. In case of multiple
sexes, the expression for fitness remains identical to (8):
G =
∑
pq
αpqEqWpq. (A9)
Consequently:
∂G
∂αij
= Ej
∑
i
Wij , (A10)
This expression vanishes in case Ej = 0, meaning that
sex j is not present in the population.
3. Comparison with model games
In evolutionary game theory, the payoffs (4) are sep-
arated into standard models games. According to this
work, the games of Leader (b > c, c > 1), Battle of the
Sexes (b < c, b > 1) and Chicken (b > 1, 0 < c < 1) lead
to development of sexual reproduction, while Prisoner’s
dilemma (b > 1, c < 0) promotes asexual populations.
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6FIG. 1: Evolution of sexual reproduction as development of sex switching and sensing abilities. Contour plot of
R (probability to possess sex complementary to the environment) in populations with varying individual switch and sensor
characteristics. The switch/sensor complex is described by αFM and αFF , representing conditional probabilities to possess
sex F in M and F environments respectively. The single point × denotes a fully developed sexual population (R = 1) while
there exist multiple possibilities for asexual populations (R = 0). Evolution is equivalent to the motion of a point, denoting a
population, from an asexual state to the sexual endpoint. Specific evolutionary mechanisms correspond to different evolutionary
pathways.
7FIG. 2: Evolutionary stability of sexual population for different values of cost of sex. The space of evolutionary
payoffs, separated into sexual and asexual evolutionary stable regions, superimposed on a contour plot of the cost of sex (Cs).
Many previous works suggested that sex is stable only if its fitness is higher than the parthenogenetic one (Cs < 1 region).
We demonstrate that the sensor/switch abilities make sex evolutionary stable for up to two-fold cost (Cs = 2). No stability is
possible for Cs > 2.
8FIG. 3: Evolutionary stability of sexual reproduction. The equation for evolutionary stability (10) defines positive and
negative semi-planes, corresponding to favorable and non-favorable mutations, dependent on payoffs b and c. A population
with arbitrary αFM and αFF (i) will always dispose of a positive region, precluding so an evolutionary stable solution. A sexual
population (ii) is evolutionary stable since no positive direction is available. The population on the αFM (iii) and αFF (iv)
edges are also unstable. If we assume opposite signs for the semi-planes as consequence of different payoff values, the asexual
populations (positioned on the edges αFM = 0 or αFF = 1) become stable, while the sexual population becomes unstable.
